The Role of Bank Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions
This paper looks at the role of commercial banks and investment banks as financial advisors. In their role as lenders and advisors, banks can be viewed as serving a certification function. However, banks acting as both lenders and advisors face a potential conflict of interest that may mitigate or offset any certification effect. Overall, we find evidence of a net certification effect for target firms but conflicts of interest for acquirers. In particular, target firms earn higher abnormal returns when the target's own bank is hired as merger advisor, consistent with the bank's role as certifier of the (more informationally opaque) target's value to the acquirer. In contrast, we find no net certification role for acquirers. There are at least two possible reasons for this. First, certification of value may be less important for acquirers because it is the target firm that must be priced in a merger. Second, acquirers may utilize commercial bank advisors in order to obtain access to bank loans to finance activities in the postmerger period. Thus, an acquirer may choose its own bank (with whom it has had a prior lending relationship) as an advisor in a merger. However, this choice weakens the certification effect and creates a potential conflict of interest because the advisor's merger advice may be distorted by considerations related to the bank's past and future lending activity.
Financial intermediaries are specialists in information production and processing. As advisors to both targets and acquirers, financial institutions utilize their information gathering expertise to ascertain the reservation price of the merger counterparty, the potential for synergistic gains, as well as the risks of the transaction.
Commercial banks may be well positioned to offer advisory services if they have established lending and other customer relationships with either party to a merger. During the course of a long-term customer relationship, a commercial bank obtains private information about a firm's cash flows, financial resources, and other exposures that can be useful in estimating the future prospects of a proposed merger. Indeed, if the role of the financial advisor in a merger is to provide information, then commercial banks, especially those with prior lending relationships, potentially have a comparative advantage over investment banks in advising their customersparticularly since, until very recently, investment banks did not make commercial loans.
1 The banking literature (see Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor 1986 , for example) suggests that information generated in the course of a lending relationship may be reusable and therefore transferable. This transfer is feasible because while SEC regulations and the U.S. bankruptcy code prohibit the transfer of information from an investment bank subsidiary to a related commercial bank subsidiary, there are no restrictions on the reuse of information obtained in the course of a standard lending relationship (e.g., on information flows from the bank's lending department to the investment bank).
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Following a parallel literature dealing with underwriting activities, we refer to a bank's ability to obtain private information about a customer and to use this information in supplying services such as merger advice to the customer as the certification effect.
3 Investment banks may also be privy to private information obtained, for example, in the course of underwriting activities. However, underwriting episodes are discrete and intermittent, corresponding to the relatively short time period surrounding the issue registration, offering period, and after-market support period. In contrast, commercial bank lending and other relationships are often long standing and continuous, requiring the ongoing monitoring of the firm's activities. All else being equal, we would expect that the selection and use of a commercial bank advisor in an M&A transaction provides a higher certification effect than that provided by traditional investment banks. 4 However, there are countervailing influences to the certification effect that may limit the effectiveness of commercial banks in providing merger advisory services. This is especially so if the bank advisor is faced with one or more conflicts of interest. For example, the target may have financial problems known privately only to its lenders (such as the major bank lender), or an acquirer may be financially weak to the private knowledge of the banker, and its ability to survive and pay off its bank debt may be enhanced through the acquisition of a target with a sizable free cash flow. In these situations, the commercial bank's certification may not be credible because of the bank's self-interest in ensuring the completion of the merger. As an example, the potential for conflicts of interest was raised in the case of Lehman Brothers, the advisor for Dynegy, the erstwhile acquirer of Enron Corporation in the context of repayment of a $179 million swap transaction. For example, Citigroup Inc. and JP Morgan Chase & Co. had been acting as both merger advisors and lenders to Enron. After Enron sought bankruptcy-law protection from creditors, those two banking firms were precluded from serving as advisors because of their creditor status (Smith 2001) .
Moreover, potential conflicts of interest are likely to be exacerbated in the case of hostile takeovers. For example, if a commercial bank customer (as a target) objects to an acquisition, perhaps because of entrenched managers' fear of loss of control, then the commercial bank may be either unable or unwilling to utilize fully its private information in advising a potential acquirer for fear of the loss of future commercial banking business should the merger actually fail to be completed.
Finally, a commercial bank may be able to attract merger advisory business only on the condition that bank loans are made available to the merger counterparties. Alternatively, a bank may be more willing to advise a firm to undertake an acquisition if it believes it can earn large fees from financing the merger through its lending department. This dual agenda may constitute a conflict of interest to the extent that the bank's advice is conditioned, in part, on the bank's concern about the profits it earns from its lending services.
The aim of this paper is to examine, empirically, whether the certification effect dominates, on a net basis, the conflict of interest effect in the market for M&A advice and to measure the relative effects on targets and acquirers of commercial bank participation as merger advisors. We compare stock market (abnormal) returns to acquirers and targets on merger deals where commercial banks have been the advisors relative to deals advised by a control group of top-tier investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter) as well as a control group of mid-tier investment banks (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, PaineWebber, and Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette).
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When we control for prior lending relationships, we find evidence of a net certification effect for commercial banks. However, this effect holds only for commercial banks' role as M&A advisors to targets. Target firms are typically smaller and more informationally opaque than acquiring firms. Banks that advise target firms can reuse information obtained in the course of a prior lending relationship by certifying the value of the merger (e.g., whether the price the acquirer offers to pay for the target is appropriate). The target bank's private information about the target firm is particularly valuable because of information asymmetries that make it difficult to certify the value of the target and because it is the target firm that must be priced in a merger. However, the certification effect is likely to be reduced if the target's bank advises the acquirer since the target's bank may be reluctant to reveal bad information about the target to the acquirer for fear that if the deal is not completed, the target will penalize the bank with the loss of its banking business. Indeed, we find that the acquirer's abnormal returns are either negative or statistically insignificant when both the target's bank and the acquirer's bank advise the acquirer and that the use of commercial bank advisors with prior lending relationships has no significant impact on acquirer abnormal returns.
However, acquirers are not indifferent to commercial bank relationships. We find that if an acquiring firm has had a prior lending relationship with a commercial bank, then the acquirer is more likely to utilize that bank as its financial advisor. This is not because of an informational certification effect but rather due to the bank's implicit (or explicit) promise of bank loans to finance the merger transaction and postmerger transition. Thus, it is the combination of merger advisory services and access to bank credit that is the focus of acquirer concerns in choosing their financial advisor.
Section 2 briefly reviews the extensive literature on mergers and acquisitions. In Section 3, we describe our methodology. The database is described in Section 4, and the empirical results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
THE LITERATURE
Several branches of the literature are relevant to our study. First, there is the literature concerning the role of advisors in creating (or destroying) value in mergers 5. The identities of the top-tier and mid-tier investment banks were obtained from Merger Advisory League Tables compiled by Thomson Financial, Bowers and Miller (1990) , and Garner and Kale (2001) . We recognize that some of the investment banks have changed names and/or have been acquired after our sample period ended. and acquisitions. Second, there is the literature comparing the role of investment banks with that of commercial banks in undertaking "investment banking-type activities." Third, there is the literature investigating the value of mergers and acquisitions per se. Rather than providing an exhaustive review, we examine selected papers' relevance to the issue at hand.
Do Advisors Add Value in Mergers?
There is a literature examining whether advisors add value to a merger. Bowers and Miller (1990) examine the relationship between an acquiring firm's stock returns and the choice of investment bank to determine whether first-tier investment banks generate better deals in terms of value creation. They classified the following as first-tier investment banks: First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Brothers. They report that total wealth gains are larger when either the target or acquirer uses a first-tier investment bank. The results suggest the importance of the advisor's credibility (reputation) in acquisitions. Hunter and Walker (1990) find that merger gains relate positively to investment banking fees and other proxies for investment banker effort. However, McLaughlin (1990 McLaughlin ( , 1992 reports that some incentive features of investment banking contracts can create conflicts of interest between an investment bank and its clients, suggesting the importance of a potential for a conflict of interest between advisors and clients in mergers and acquisitions. Servaes and Zenner (1996) compare acquisitions that were completed in-house versus those that use investment bank advisors. They find that an investment bank is used in more complex transactions with asymmetric information, documenting the importance of the information collection process in mergers and acquisitions. Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2001) find that abnormal returns are positively related to the fraction of the acquisition financed by bank debt, thereby suggesting a certification role for commercial banks in acquisitions financed using cash tender offers.
Building on the theoretical model in James (1992) , Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) find that merger advisory fees include a relationship premium that is consistent with the existence of switching costs borne by acquirers when they hire new advisors with whom they had no prior relationship. If merger fees are set competitively, an explanation for this relationship premium is a certification effect, whereby rents are paid to banks with superior information obtained in the course of a prior relationship. Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) also find that top-tier advisors charge higher fees than lower-tier investment banks and that acquirers pay a relationship premium in merger fees that is highest for top-tier advisors. Although Rau (2000) finds no impact of advisors on acquirer abnormal returns, he shows a positive relationship between investment bank market share and fees and deal completion rates. That is, top-tier investment bank advisors create value by increasing the likelihood that the deal will be completed.
These previous studies focus on mergers advised by investment banks. We extend the literature by examining whether a commercial bank's greater potential net certification ability contributes value to a merger or acquisition beyond that provided by traditional investment banks.
Investment versus Commercial Banks Providing
Investment Banking Services The debate regarding financial services modernization and the elimination of the Glass-Steagall Act has fueled a number of academic studies contrasting the roles of investment banks to commercial banks. Similar in flavor, if not in substance, to our study is the literature on the potential for conflicts of interest in securities underwriting.
While the Glass-Steagall Act has now been repealed, 6 its historic rationale can be traced, in part, to concerns that commercial bank underwriters have conflicts of interest that will encourage the public issuance of securities in order to reduce their own poor quality loan exposures. In general, empirical evidence has not supported the existence of such a conflict of interest. Kroszner and Rajan (1994) , Ang and Richardson (1994) , and Puri (1996) , among others, 7 find that the debt securities underwritten by commercial banks prior to Glass-Steagall's passage in 1933 were less likely to default than those underwritten by investment banks. In addition, yields tended to be lower and the credit quality higher for commercial bank-underwritten issues than for issues underwritten by investment banks. Moreover, no significant difference was found in the performance of the equities underwritten by investment banks during the 1920s as opposed to commercial bank affiliates. Indeed, Puri (1994 Puri ( , 1996 finds evidence of a certification role for commercial banks as they enhance their reputations by reusing private information obtained in the course of lending relationships.
More recent (post-1990) evidence based on the limited debt underwriting powers for banks in Gande et al. (1997) and equity underwriting powers in Hebb (1999) have tended to confirm the earlier evidence of a net certification effect for banks. Although the Glass-Steagall Act did not prohibit banks from advising in mergers and acquisitions cases, the relevance of certification effects and of potential conflicts of interest, in the area of merger advisement, is the central empirical question being investigated in this paper.
The Value of Mergers and Acquisitions
Out of the exhaustive empirical literature on mergers and acquisitions, one result is highly robust. This is the empirical finding that target firms tend to experience positive abnormal returns upon merger announcements, while acquirers post zero or negative abnormal returns.
8 Thus, targets appear to obtain most of the expected merger and acquisition gains. 6. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (or the Financial Services Modernization Act) of 1999 essentially eliminates the major barriers among banking, securities, and insurance activities.
7. See Benston (1990) as well as the citations in Note 3. 8. Bank mergers are an exception to this generalization. For example, James and Weir (1987) find significant positive abnormal returns for acquirers in bank mergers. See Palia (1994) for a survey of empirical studies on bank mergers.
9. Existing literature on the postmerger performance of acquiring firms, however, is divided. Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) find that stockholders of acquiring firms suffer a 10% loss over the five-year postmerger period and that neither the firm size effect nor the beta estimation problems are the cause of the negative postmerger returns. In contrast, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) find significant postmerger increases in operating cash flow returns. Linn and Switzer (2001) show that postmerger performance is better for cash financed deals.
Target gains stem from many sources. The corporate control hypothesis, studied by Harris and Raviv (1988) , Stulz (1988) , Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) , and Franks and Mayer (1996) , links merger gains to the reduction in agency costs in the market for corporate control. The market power hypothesis stipulates that mergers enhance the competitive position of the target [see Beatty, Santomero, and Smirlock, 1987, and Berger and Humphrey, 1992] . Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) find evidence of the synergy motive in mergers and acquisitions. Hubbard and Palia (1999) find synergistic gains to targets in the creation of internal capital markets within conglomerates created by a program of diversifying mergers and acquisitions.
Whereas targets must receive some expectation of gain in order to win the approval of their target shareholders for any merger, those acquirer firm managers, who are unconstrained by pressure from value maximizing shareholders, may embark on acquisitions that offer no ex ante gain to stockholders. The managerial risk diversification hypothesis [see Amihud and Lev, 1981 , Amihud and Kamin, 1979 , and Lloyd, Hand, and Modani, 1987 postulates that acquiring firm managers undertake (value reducing) mergers in order to reduce their undiversifiable human capital investment in their firm. Evidence of this is shown in Amihud, Kamin, and Ronen (1983) . In a European context, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) show that diversifying mergers are value reducing, whereas focusing mergers are value enhancing. In the winner's curse or hubris hypothesis, overly optimistic acquirers overbid for targets. For example, Roll (1986) shows that acquirers who overestimate the value of the target are more likely to successfully complete a merger, resulting in a decline in the acquirer's value to stockholders.
The question, unexamined prior to this paper, is how the choice of financial advisor impacts the distribution of gains between target and acquirer upon the announcement of a merger.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY

Computing Abnormal Returns for Targets and Acquirers
To investigate the net certification role of commercial banks as merger and acquisition advisors, we compute standardized cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) to both targets and acquirers for a three-day window around the merger announcement date. Our estimates of three-day abnormal returns, denoted (Ϫ1,ϩ1), include the day of the merger announcement as well as one day before and after. 10 We test for the explanatory power of the advisor's identity, controlling for other deal-specific factors. Even if the advisors' identities were not publicly revealed on the merger announcement date, the market would reward well-designed and attractively priced deals without necessarily knowing the advisors' role in producing the positive results.
Our estimation of target and acquirer abnormal returns follows well-established procedures used in other event studies such as Fama et al. (1969) , Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) , and Stulz, Walking, and Song (1990) . We estimate a single-index model using the University of Chicago's Center of Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) market-weighted index and daily stock returns to compute expected (benchmark) returns. Specifically, market model parameters for both target and acquiring firms are estimated using 190 trading days of daily returns data, beginning 250 days and ending 60 days before the first announcement of the merger. 
Controlling for the Identity of the Advisor, Characteristics of Targets and Acquirers, and Deal-Specific Factors
The identity of the bank advisor and the credit/lending relationship 12 between the bank advisor and target and/or acquirer is defined by four different dummy variables (summarized for reference in Table 1 ): TB_BT takes on the value 1 if the target's advisor is a commercial bank and if the bank advisor had a prior relationship with the target (i.e., the Target is advised by a Bank_the Bank has lent money to the Target); TB_BA takes on the value 1 if the target's advisor is a commercial bank and if the bank advisor had a prior relationship with the acquirer (the Target is advised by a Bank_the Bank has lent money to the Acquirer); AB_BT takes on the value 1 if the acquirer's advisor is a commercial bank and if the bank advisor had a prior relationship with the target (the Acquirer is advised by a Bank_the Bank has lent money to the Target); AB_BA takes on the value 1 if the acquirer's advisor is a commercial bank and if the bank advisor had a prior relationship with the acquirer (the Acquirer is advised by a Bank_the Bank has lent money to the Acquirer).
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We distinguish between deals advised by top-tier and mid-tier investment banks and those advised by commercial banks through the use of the variable DUMBANK, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all commercial bank advised deals and 0 for deals advised by the investment bank control group. The dummy variable TOPTIER denotes all mergers that involve at least one top-tier investment bank advisor on either the target and/or acquirer side. The dummy variable MIDTIER indicates deals that use only mid-tier investment bank advisors for both the target and the acquirer. The control groups are chosen such that only top-tier (mid-tier) investment banks advise both counterparties to the merger, thereby excluding transactions in which one counterparty is advised by an investment bank and another by a commercial bank. 14 11. We used the first announcement date for multiple or revised bid deals. If daily return data were unavailable for the full 250 days prior to merger announcement, then the normal estimation period was less than the full 190 days. The minimum estimation period in our sample was 48 days.
12. A credit/lending relationship exists if the bank has made loans to either merger counterparty at some date prior to the merger announcement date. The precise empirical definition of a credit/lending relationship is presented in Section 3.
13. More than one of these variables could take on the value of 1 for any given observation. Thus, if TB_BT ϭ TB_BA ϭ 1, then the target's advisor has had prior lending relationships with both target and acquirer.
14. In the wake of the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, financial holding companies (FHC) can be formed by merging commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies. For the purposes of this study, we consider any financial institution with a substantial commercial bank subsidiary to be a "commercial bank." Thus, we classify Citigroup (an FHC) as a commercial bank. In our regression analysis, we also control for deal specific variables not related to the identity and relationship of the advisors to targets and acquirers. Several control factors are incorporated into the model to capture the impact on abnormal returns resulting from characteristics of the target, the acquirer, or the merger offer. These control factors are discussed next.
Control factors. A robust result in the merger literature is that announcement returns to bidding firms that make cash offers are higher than when stock offers are made [see Travlos 1987] since a bidder with private information about the value of its own assets offers stock when its shares are overvalued by target shareholders. Recognizing this adverse selection effect, target shareholders reduce their estimate of a bidder's value. Thus, without some other benefit to target stockholders in receiving stock rather than cash as a means of payment, a "lemons problem" arises for stock offers. 15 The means of payment in a merger and acquisition is incorporated in our model through the variable PCTCASH (a variable that reflects the percentage of the deal's value that is paid for in cash). Previous studies, such as Travlos (1987) , suggest a positive coefficient on the PCTCASH variable. Stulz, Walking, and Song (1990) find that the relationship between a target's abnormal return and the target firm's ownership structure depends on the relative power of the bidder to successfully complete the acquisition without competition from other bidders (i.e., the stronger the bidder-in terms of lower target management's ownership stake, larger bidder ownership stake, or fewer bidders-the lower the target's abnormal returns). Our empirical proxy variable for this effect takes the form of BVPREM, which is defined as the initial offer price for the target over the target's book value of equity.
16 Since a multiple-bidder auction for the target tends to offer a relatively large initial acquisition premium, we anticipate a direct relationship between BVPREM and target abnormal returns. This relationship is also consistent with Roll's (1986) hubris hypothesis.
Following Doukas and Travlos (1988) and Kang (1993) , who find evidence of positive abnormal returns for international acquisitions, we use a zero-one dummy variable denoting whether the deal is a cross-border merger or not (CROSS). Because integration of larger targets into the acquiring firm is likely to generate agency cost 15. Brown and Ryngaert (1991) shows that taxes should also have important implications for the bidder's decision regarding the means of payment, cash versus stock mixes.
16. The variable BVPREM may also proxy for the existence of intangible assets or growth opportunities. However, in the absence of a competitive takeover market (induced by either multiple bidders or entrenched management), the acquirer may not be forced to pay for those intangibles.
reductions in value, we incorporate the control variable RELSIZE, measured as the ratio of the market value of equity of the target to that of the acquirer. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) show that as a firm becomes more diverse (measured empirically as the deviation in size across all firm subdivisions), internal capital may be misallocated within the firm due to inefficiencies as a result of the battle between competing divisions for scarce capital resources. Since integration of a relatively large target in the course of a merger is likely to accentuate the internal power struggle over capital allocation, we expect a negative relationship between RELSIZE and abnormal returns. Cotter and Zenner (1994) document that abnormal returns are lower for hostile compared with friendly mergers, controlling for size (market value of equity), ownership factors, and other characteristics of the offer (e.g., whether there are multiple bidders). Consequently, we incorporate the variable ATTITUDE (hostile, neutral, or friendly) into our estimation. We also check for robustness using CLOSE (a dummy variable denoting whether or not the target is closely held, i.e., management has a majority stake), MGMT (denoting whether the target's management were integrated into the merged firm), and PROTECT (denoting whether the target firm had protective mechanisms such as golden parachutes or poison pills). The latter variable is also suggested by the findings of Comment and Schwert (1995) , who showed higher takeover premiums for firms with anti-takeover provisions in place.
Dummy variables indicating the motive for the acquisition are included based on the findings of Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) , who suggest that synergy is the primary motive in takeovers with positive total gains to both targets and acquirers and that agency conflicts are the primary motive in takeovers with negative gains to both targets and acquirers. Targets may also be valuable because of their high profitability (proxied by TPROFIT), growth rate (proxied by TGROWTH), or Tobin's q (measured as the market price to book value of the target firm's assets, TOBINQ). 17 We control for the target firm's leverage ratio using the variable TLEVER. Finally, annual (time) dummy variables are used to differentiate mergers announced each year from 1995 to 2000.
We estimate the following expressions for both targets and acquirers separately:
17. TOBINQ and TGROWTH proxy for intangible assets and growth opportunities that may offer the acquirer potentially synergistic gains. However, a rapidly growing firm may be subject to organizational agency problems that limit the acquirer's ability to realize that potential. Moreover, TPROFIT may proxy for the target's free cash flow, which may induce nonsynergistic mergers.
The dependent variable SCAR i is the three-day standardized cumulative abnormal return to target and acquiring firm i, and all control variables are as defined in Table 2.   18 3. THE DATA Mergers and acquisitions data were obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. All mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. target firms over the period January 1, 1995, through December 31, 2000, were identified. We excluded all mergers involving financial firms as either target or acquirer. 19 We formed a subset of deals consisting of merger transactions in which either side of the transaction (target or acquirer) or both list a commercial bank or its subsidiary as an advisor. 20 We then conducted a Lexis/Nexis search on each of the targets and acquirers to determine whether there was a prior lending relationship with any of the bank advisors. In this search, we examined SEC 10K, 10Q, and 8K filings as well as annual reports, prospectuses, and other registered filings that dated back to January 1990 in order to determine whether the bank advisors had any prior credit/lending relationship with either of the parties to the merger. 21 If the bank advisor was listed in any of the SEC filings of the merger parties, we recorded a bank relationship dummy variable with value 1. 22 If there was no mention of the bank advisor, but there was a description of other bank relationships, we recorded a bank relationship dummy variable with value 0.
23 If there was any ambiguity in 18 . In order to examine other variables considered in the merger literature, we conducted robustness checks of our model. We incorporated a control variable, TENDER, denoting whether a tender offer had occurred since it has been established that successful tender offers may increase target shareholder wealth [see Jensen and Ruback 1983] . In addition to the control variable PCTCASH discussed in the subsection on control factors, we focused on several other methods of financing mergers and acquisitions. These included SFC (a dummy variable indicating the issuance of common stock to finance the acquisition), SFCORP (a dummy variable indicating the use of internally generated funds), SFDEBT (a dummy variable indicating the use of debt), and SWAP (a dummy variable denoting a stock swap). We also included an ownership variable, BLOCK, to denote block shareholdings, MOE (an SDCdesignation of "merger of equals"), and the variable CASHFLOW to measure free cash flow (computed as cash assets divided by total assets). We included a dummy variable, MERGER, for completed target acquisitions (denoted by a value of 1) in contrast to partial acquisitions, spin-offs, or split-offs (all denoted as 0). Following Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) , a variable FEES controlled for total fees paid by both target and acquirer as a percent of transaction value. None of these variables turned out to be statistically significant, and we do not present them in the regression results presented in Section 4.
19. This provides a cleaner test of the impact of prior lending relationships on merger returns because lending between financial institutions may be short term and therefore have less information content (e.g., overnight Fed funds lending and repo transactions).
20. Several commercial bank holding companies themselves acquired investment firms during the sample period. We included acquisitions advised by the investment firm as acquisitions advised by commercial banks if the deal was announced after the commercial bank acquired the investment firm. For instance, in April 1997, Alex-Brown & Company was acquired by Bankers Trust. Prior to that date, acquisitions advised by Alex-Brown were considered to be non-bank advised mergers. After that date, they were classified as bank advised mergers.
21. Lexis/Nexis provides prospectuses and registration statements from April 1993 to the present only. 22. Because the SEC does not require firms to reveal specific details about their banking relationships, we could not utilize more detailed data about the nature of the relationship. Data obtained from Loan Pricing Corporation contained more detailed descriptions of the lending relationship.
23. We therefore avoided the problem of recording no relationship for companies that chose not to report any of their banking arrangements. Unless there was a systematic attempt to omit the names of merger advisors from firm disclosures of lending relationships, this should result in an unbiased sample. defining the bank relationship for either the target or the acquirer, we recorded the relationship as missing, and the observation was dropped from the analysis. Using this procedure, we constructed the four dummy variables that distinguish among the four possible lending relationships: the target's bank advising the target (TB_BT), the acquirer's bank advising the target (TB_BA), the target's bank advising the acquirer (AB_BT), and the acquirer's bank advising the acquirer (AB_BA).
To fill in the gaps and add additional detail to the description of bank relationships, we obtained data on loan syndications from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC). If LPC showed that a bank advisor had participated in a loan syndication in any capacity (i.e., as an agent, arranger, or participant) prior to the merger announcement date, then we recorded that as a prior lending relationship. The LPC database includes description of the role of the lender, the origination date of the loan syndication, and the purpose of the loan, among other descriptive variables. We used these variables to analyze the intensity of the lending relationship for the subset of deals that were included in the LPC database. 24 We also used the more detailed LPC database to define the ACCESS indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer's bank is hired as an advisor and subsequently makes a loan to the acquirer within two years after the merger announcement date.
Our sample includes only those firms whose shares were traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. In order to obtain a nonmerger period, with which to estimate abnormal returns, we utilized returns for a full year prior to the start of our merger sample period of January 1995 through December 2000. Thus, daily stock returns over the period January 1, 1994, through December 31, 2000, were obtained from CRSP. 25 We verified the SDC announcement date using the Wall Street Journal and used the date in the Wall Street Journal whenever there was a discrepancy.
Next, we constructed a control sample of deals advised by (1) top-tier investment banks, defined to be Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and (2) mid-tier investment banks, defined to be Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, PaineWebber, and Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette (during the time periods when each of these firms was independent). Deals were included in the control sample only if there were no commercial bank advisors for either the target or the acquirer. When all financial mergers and nonpublicly traded companies were excluded, we were left with 189 deals 26 in the investment bank control sample. Control variables were constructed from SDC, CRSP, and COMPUSTAT. The tickers for each acquirer and target provided by SDC were matched with the CRSP permanent numbers in order to obtain daily return data and market capitalization values as of the deal announcement date. Wherever necessary, COMPUSTAT data were used to fill in the values of control variables such as TLEVER (target debt/ 24. Although LPC focuses on syndicated loans, it also includes some private placements and underwritten debt. However, since the SEC filings consider all bank lending relationships, we used the LPC database to fill in the missing observations from the more comprehensive Lexis/Nexis. 25. The CRSP Permanent Number was used to obtain a continuous series of stock return data even if company name, ticker, or CUSIP changed.
26. There were 189 targets and 175 acquirers in the control sample. The difference in the number of observations stems from deals in which there was no advisor chosen by either target or acquirer. equity ratios) and TPROFIT (target return on assets). A list of definitions of all control variables is shown in Table 2 .
The overall sample (including investment banks and commercial banks as advisors) consists of 488 targets and 495 acquirers.
27 Tables 3 and 4 display key descriptive statistics.
28 Table 3 shows that targets (acquirers) hired bank advisors in 31.4% (34.3%) of the deals. Out of the total number of mergers, 36.8% of the target advisors had prior lending relationships with either the target (22.5%) or the acquirer (14.3%). Table 3 also shows that 27.9% of the acquirer advisors had prior lending relationships with either the target (12.9%) or the acquirer (15%). The control group of top-tier and mid-tier investment banks advised 38.7% of the targets and 35.4% of the acquirers. Most of the mergers in our sample (62.1%) took place in the years 1998 (23.6%) and 2000 (38.5%). 29 Finally, most deals (93.4%) were classified by SDC as either friendly or neutral. However, average target abnormal returns were significantly (at the 10% level) higher for hostile deals (a mean abnormal return of 5.12%) than for friendly/neutral deals (a mean of 3.32%). 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Consistent with the literature to date, Table 3 shows that target abnormal returns are on average positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (averaging 3.38%), whereas acquirer abnormal returns are negative (on average, Ϫ0.31% significant at the 1% level). Focusing on differences in means between groups using different advisors, Table 3 shows that target abnormal returns are significantly increased (a t-value of 1.94, significant at the 5% level) when the target hires its own bank as advisor (TB_BT ϭ 1) as compared with the group where TB_BT ϭ 0. Moreover, acquirer abnormal returns increase when both advisors are mid-tier investment banks (a t-value of 1.80, significant at the 10% level) and decrease when either advisor is a top-tier investment bank 31 (a t-value of Ϫ2.30, significant at the 1% level) or when targets hire the acquirer's bank as merger advisor (a t-value of Ϫ2.20, 27. There are more targets than acquiring firms because some acquirers are foreign firms that are not traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. However, most foreign acquirers are traded on U.S. stock exchanges. Excluding all foreign acquirers would have resulted in the loss of more than 100 observations. Thus, we control for cross-border acquisitions in our analysis.
28. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for control variables. There were 684 observations in the merger database, but data availability on CRSP and COMPUSTAT limited our final sample to 488 targets and 495 acquirers.
29. Although the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (permitting investment banks to acquire commercial bank subsidiaries) took effect in March 2000, we find no impact on our results for the pre-versus the post-GLBA periods.
30. We performed pairwise mean difference tests using both the pooled and Satterthwaite methods to control for the possibility of unequal variances. Whenever statistically significant, the t-values of pairwise mean difference tests are reported in parentheses in Tables 3 and 4. 31. The result that acquirer abnormal returns are significantly lower for deals advised by top-tier investment banks is consistent with Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) , who find that acquirers pay toptier investment banks significantly higher fees for merger advice, thereby reducing acquirer abnormal returns. This result is also consistent with the results of Rau (2000) and Hunter and Jagtiani (2001) , who find that top-tier investment banks tend to advise acquirers to pay too much for target firms. 3.34%*** Ϫ0.36%* Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, testing whether the mean equals zero. Whenever statistically significant, mean differences between the sample and control groups are reported as t-values in parentheses. The sign on the t-value is positive (negative) if the sample mean is significantly greater (smaller) than the mean of the control group. For example, mean SCARs for acquirers in deals in which both sides were advised by top-tier investment banks were significantly (at the 1% level) lower than mean SCARs for acquirers in deals advised by either commercial banks or mid-tier investment banks.
significant at the 5% level). All other differences in means for other group comparisons were statistically insignificant. Table 5 examine the three-day abnormal returns controlling for deal characteristics but not controlling for the existence of prior lending relationships. Although we examine all the control variables listed in Tables  1 and 2 , we present the results for only the most consistently significant variables in Tables 5-7 . These control variables can be divided into two groups: (1) Deal characteristics such as PCTCASH (the percentage of cash used to finance the merger), BVPREM (the premium of the bid price over the target's book value of assets), ATTITUDE (ϭ0 if friendly or neutral, ϭ1 if hostile) 32 , COMPLETE (ϭ1 if the deal is completed, 0 otherwise), and CROSS (ϭ1 if the acquirer is a non-U.S. firm, 0 otherwise); and (2) firm characteristics such as TGROWTH (the target 32. We tested the cross product of the ATTITUDE variable with the relationship dummy variables and found no significance. Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses. a The variable TLEVER obtained from COMPUSTAT is long-term debt divided by total common equity. Common equity is defined as common stock outstanding (including stock adjustments) ϩ capital surplus ϩ retained earnings ϩ treasury stock adjustments for common and nonredeemable preferred stock. The value is negative for distressed firms (15 target firms in our sample).
Target and Acquirer Abnormal Returns without Controlling for Lending Relationships The regressions presented in
firm growth rate), TPROFIT (the target firm's return on assets), and TLEVER (the target firm's long-term debt to equity ratio). Descriptive statistics for these control variables are shown in Table 4 . The regressions presented in column (1) of Table 5 are consistent with the Table  3 finding that the identity of the financial advisor does not have any significant impact on target abnormal returns. That is, the coefficients on the DUMBANK (ϭ1 if there is at least one commercial bank advisor and 0 otherwise) and MIDTIER variables (ϭ1 if all advisors are mid-tier investment banks and 0 otherwise) are insignificantly different from zero. However, once we control for deal and firm characteristics, the positive and significant (at the 5% level) coefficient on the DUMBANK variable in column (2) of Table 5 shows that target abnormal returns are higher for mergers advised by commercial banks than for investment bank-advised deals. This result suggests that target firm abnormal returns tend to increase when commercial banks are chosen as their advisors. Moreover, consistent with the literature, we find that cash financing has a strong positive impact (significant at the 1% level) on target abnormal returns. Table 3 shows that without controlling for prior lending relationships or deal characteristics, the average acquirer three-day abnormal return is significantly lower for deals advised by top-tier investment banks. The uncontrolled regression shown in column (3) of Table 5 is consistent with that finding. That is, the coefficients on the DUMBANK and MIDTIER variables are significantly positive (at the 10% level or better), indicating that acquirer returns are higher for deals advised by either commercial bank or mid-tier investment bank advisors than for the omitted toptier investment bank advisor group. However, this result is not obtained when we control for deal characteristics. That is, the coefficients on the DUMBANK variable and MIDTIER are insignificant in the regressions presented in column (4) of Table 5 .
The results for the control variables presented in column (4) of Table 5 are consistent with previous studies. Acquirer returns are positively related to PCTCASH (significant at the 1% level), and BVPREM (significant at the 5% level) and negatively related to TGROWTH and TPROFIT (both significant at the 5% level). Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses Moreover, acquirer returns are significantly higher (at the 5% level or better) for deals announced in 1995, 1996, 1998, and 1999 as compared with the omitted base year of 2000.
In summary, the results in Table 5 suggest that abnormal returns earned by target firms upon merger announcement are higher when commercial bank advisors are chosen, with no similar relationship for acquirers. However, the results in Table 5 Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard are errors in parentheses do not control for prior lending relationships between advisors and merger counterparties. In Section 4.2, we report results of multivariate regressions of lending relationships and control variables on target abnormal returns. In Section 4.3, we perform the same multivariate regression analysis but instead with acquirer abnormal returns as the dependent variable. We summarize our findings on the relationship between lending relationships and acquirer and target abnormal returns in Section 4.4. Table 6 shows that target abnormal returns are affected by prior lending relationships. The narrow regression results presented in Table 6 , column (1), show that targets benefit from hiring their own banks as advisors in mergers and acquisitions, as denoted by the dummy variable TB_BT. Regressing the four relationship dummies (TB_BT, TB_BA, AB_BT, and AB_BA) on target abnormal returns yields a positive coefficient for TB_BT (significant at the 5% level). All other relationship dummy variables are statistically insignificant. Thus, the nature of the prior relationship between the bank advisor and its merger counterparty is important in determining the size of a target's abnormal returns. This positive relationship between target abnormal returns and the TB_BT relationship dummy variable is consistent with the mean results shown in Table 3 , in which average abnormal returns for targets hiring their own banks as advisors was 4.25%, significantly higher (at the 5% level) than the mean target abnormal return of 3.12% if TB_BT ϭ 0. Further, the addition of control variables does not eliminate the impact of bank relationships on a target's abnormal returns but rather enhances its significance. In both columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 , the TB_BT coefficient remains statistically positive and significant at the 1% level when other control variables are added.
Target Abnormal Returns Controlling for Lending Relationships
Results for the control variables shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 are consistent with the literature that show that cash financed mergers have significantly (at the 1% level) higher target abnormal returns, as denoted by the positive coefficients on PCTCASH. None of the other control variables are statistically significant. Table 7 analyzes acquirer abnormal returns controlling for lending relationships. In the narrow regression results shown in column (1) of Table 7 , none of the relationship variables is significant, but the negative coefficient on the TOPTIER variable (ϭ1 if at least one advisor is a top-tier investment bank and there are no commercial banks, 0 otherwise) is significant at the 10% level. This is consistent with the mean results presented in Table 3 showing that average abnormal returns are lowest for the acquirer when the advisors are top-tier investment banks. However, although this result holds in column (2) of Table 7 (when control variables are added), it is not statistically significant in column (3) of Table 7 when the full set of control variables (including year dummy variables) are entered as explanatory variables. Table 7 presents some evidence that the gains to targets from hiring their own bank may come at the expense of acquirers. The negative coefficient on TB_BT (significant at the 10% level or better) in columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 shows that the target's gain in merger negotiations is the acquirer's loss. That is, if targets use their banks to certify higher target firm values, then acquirers pay higher prices for acquisitions, thereby decreasing acquirer abnormal returns. 33 Comparing the size of 33. One possible reason that acquirers may not benefit from prior lending relationships may be that the target's advisor uses its information asymmetrically to benefit its own client (which is the target), thereby certifying that an acquirer's bid price is too low but not that it is too high. the coefficients on the TB_BT variable in Tables 6 and 7 , there appears to be a net overall gain when targets choose their own banks as advisors. That is, the target's gain (as shown by a coefficient in excess of 2 in Table 6 ) is greater than the acquirer's loss (as shown by a coefficient of about -0.6 in Table 7) .
Acquirer Abnormal Returns Controlling for Lending Relationships
Introduction of the control variables into columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 indicates that the coefficient on PCTCASH is significantly positive (at the 1% level). All other control variables show similar coefficients to the model presented in column (4) of Table 5 with the exception of the merger year effect. Acquirer abnormal returns are highest for mergers announced in 1995 and 1996 as compared with the base case year 2000, as evident from the significantly positive (at the 5% level) coefficients on the D95 and D96 variables. 
Summary of Tests Assessing the Contribution of Prior Lending
Relationships to Target and Acquirer Abnormal Returns There are two major results that are consistent throughout Tables 3-7 as well as in other robustness tests not discussed above. 35 The first is that target firms earn significantly higher abnormal returns upon a merger announcement when they hire their own banks as their merger advisor. We interpret this result as evidence of a bank certification role in merger advisement for the more informationally opaque target firms. That is, the target can achieve a better price if its own bank certifies its value.
The second major finding is that using commercial banks as advisors appears to have no significant impact on acquirer abnormal returns. That is, we find no evidence of a certification effect for bank advisors that have had prior lending relationships with the acquirer. However, although acquirer abnormal returns are not significantly affected by the existence of a prior lending relationship, the acquiring firm is not indifferent to the choice of financial advisor as is discussed in the next section. In Section 4.5, we examine the factors that impact the acquirer's choice of merger advisor.
The Choice of Financial Advisor
Up until this point, we have made the implicit assumption that the choice of an advisor is exogenous. However, the identity of the merger advisor may be endogenously determined by the intensity of prior lending relationships. Access to credit appears to be an important motive influencing the choice of merger advisor for 34. The ACCESS control variable (which takes on a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the acquirer's bank lends to the acquirer up to one year after the merger announcement) is insignificant in all models presented in Table 7 because the market may not know of these future loans upon merger announcement.
35. We performed robustness tests using all the control variables presented in Tables 1 and 2 . Moreover, we tested whether the bank advisor's certification effect was more important for deals that are relatively complex such as those involving tender offers or stock swaps. When we tested this hypothesis by segmenting the sample of commercial bank-advised mergers into subsamples of commercial bankadvised deals both with and without tender offers, as well as subsamples both with and without stock swaps, we found support for our basic result that targets increase their abnormal returns by hiring their own banks as advisors.
an acquirer. Thus, acquirers may prefer to hire commercial bank advisors, particularly those with lending relationships (to either of the merger counterparties), because they are more likely to make loans in the future to the merged entity. To examine this further, we test the link between choice of merger advisor and lending relationships using the binomial logit model shown in Table 8 . The dependent variable S takes on a value of 0 if the merger advisors to both the target and the acquirer are either investment banks or commercial banks with no prior lending relationships to either merger party and 1 if either the target's or the acquirer's financial advisor is a commercial bank with a prior lending relationship to either of the merger counterparties.
36
The independent variables in the logit model in Table 8 reflect the intensity of the prior lending relationship. We use the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) database to measure relationship intensity. 37 There are three prior relationship intensity variables: LENDER, DURATION, and PURPOSE. LENDER takes on three possible values: 2 if LPC records that the lender was an agent or arranger of the loan syndication, 1 if LPC records that the lender was only a participant in the loan syndication, and 0 if there was no lending relationship.
38 Thus, the higher the value of LENDER, the more intense the prior lending relationship. We examine the LENDER variable for each of the lending relationships (TB_BT, TB_BA, AB_BT, AB_BA) independently; i.e., Lender_TBBA denotes the intensity of the lending relationship between the target's advisor and the acquiring firm.
The second independent variable, DURATION, denotes the time period between the merger announcement date and the origination date of the earliest loan syndication between the target and the target's advisor (denoted as Duration_TBBT), between the target and the acquirer's advisor (Duration_TBBA), between the acquirer and the target's advisor (Duration_ABBT), and between the acquirer and the acquirer's advisor (Duration_ABBA). Thus, the longer DURATION, the more long-lived the prior lending relationship. Finally, PURPOSE is an LPC variable that takes on three possible values: 2 if the loan was made for general business purposes, 1 if it was merger related, and 0 if there was no lending relationship. Since we are interested in the bank's access to private information about the firm's activities prior to the merger announcement, we hypothesize that the higher the PURPOSE variable, the 36. We also tested a disaggregated model (not shown) that examined the target's choice independently of the acquirer's choice of financial advisor. We found that there was no significant impact of the prior lending relationship on the target's choice. This is consistent with the target's concern with maximizing its abnormal return upon merger announcement. Thus, there should be no selection bias in the regressions presented in Table 6 . In contrast, the acquirer would be concerned with access to capital to finance the integration of the two firms. We find that the intensity of the prior lending relationship has a significant impact on the acquirer's choice of financial advisor.
37. Since we have LPC data for only a subset of the database, we estimate the model in Table 8  using 241 mergers. 38. The use of discrete independent variables that can take on values of 0, 1, or 2 is not inconsistent with the logit model in which the latent dependent variable is taken as either 0 or 1. In particular, the loan intensity independent variables are empirical proxies for an unobservable, continuous intensity variable such that there is a basic mapping of the discrete intensity variable into the unobservable continuous variable that preserves the ordering. That is, a bank with no lending relationship has a lower lending intensity than a syndicate participant, which, in turn, has a lower lending relationship than the syndicate agent bank.
TABLE 8
Binomial Logit Model for Advisor Choice
The dependent variable is an advisor selection indicator variable S such that S ϭ 0 if the target and the acquirer use either nonbank advisors or banks with no prior relationships with either merger counterparty, and S ϭ 1 if either the target or the acquirer uses a bank advisor with a prior lending relationship with either the target or the acquirer. In model (1), the independent variables are as follows: Lender_TBBT (Lender_ABBT) ϭ 0 if the target firm has no lending relationships with the target (acquirer) advisor; ϭ1 if the target's bank acted as a participant in a loan syndication to the target (acquiring) firm prior to the deal announcement date; ϭ2 if the target's bank acted as an agent or arranger for a loan syndication to the target (acquiring) firm prior to the deal announcement date. Lender_TBBA (Lender_ABBA) ϭ 0 if the acquirer has no lending relationships with the target (acquirer) advisors; ϭ1 if the acquirer's bank acted as a participant in a loan syndication to the target (acquiring) firm prior to the deal announcement date; ϭ2 if the acquirer's bank acted as an agent or arranger for a loan syndication to the target (acquiring) firm prior to the deal announcement date. Duration_TBBT (Duration_ABBT) ϭ the length of time (in years) between the origination of the earliest loan syndication to the target by the target (acquirer) advisor. Duration_TBBA (Duration_ABBA) ϭ the length of time (in years) between the origination of the earliest loan syndication to the acquirer by the target (acquirer) advisor. Purpose_TBBT (Purpose_ABBT) ϭ 0 if there were no prior loan syndications to the target firm involving the target (acquirer) advisor; ϭ1 if the purpose of the loan syndication by the target (acquirer) advisor to the target firm was related to an acquisition; ϭ2 if the purpose of the loan syndication by the target (acquirer) advisor to the target firm was for general business purposes. Purpose_TBBA (Purpose_ABBA) ϭ 0 if there were no prior loan syndications to the acquiring firm involving the target (acquirer) advisor; ϭ1 if the purpose of the loan syndication by the target (acquirer) advisor to the acquirer was related to an acquisition; ϭ2 if the purpose of the loan syndication by the target (acquirer) advisor to the acquirer was for general business purposes. Nonadvisor Lender_T (Nonadvisor Lender_A) ϭ 0 if there were no loan syndications involving nonadvisors to the target (acquirer); ϭ1 if the highest level of participation by any nonadvisor in a loan syndication to the target (acquirer) was as a participant; ϭ2 if the highest level of participation by any nonadvisor in a loan syndication to the target (acquirer) was as an agent or arranger. Nonadvisor Duration_T (Nonadvisor Duration_A) ϭ the length of time between the merger announcement date and the earliest loan syndication involving a bank that advises neither the target nor the acquirer. Nonadvisor Purpose_T (Nonadvisor Purpose_A) ϭ 0 if there were no loan syndications involving nonadvisors to the target (acquirer); ϭ1 if the purpose of the loan syndication by any nonadvisor to the target (acquirer) was related to an acquisition; ϭ2 if the purpose of the loan syndication by any nonadvisor to the target (acquirer) was for general business purposes. ACCESS ϭ1 (0 otherwise) if the acquirer's bank is chosen as an advisor, and the advising bank subsequently lends to the acquirer up to one year after the merger announcement date. greater the information content generated by the lending relationship. That is, merger related loan syndications tend to have somewhat narrow focus and are of limited duration. Instead, general business lending allows the bank to obtain information about the day-to-day investment and financing activities of the firm. Finally, we define all three variables LENDER, DURATION, and PURPOSE for nonadvisor banks as well as advisor banks. The results presented in Table 8 confirm the hypothesis that the more intense the prior lending relationship, the greater the likelihood that the commercial bank is chosen as financial advisor. Moreover, it is the intensity of the prior lending relationship with the acquirer that determines the choice of financial advisor, in contrast to the role of the prior lending relationship with the target that generated the certification gains documented in Section 4.2. That is, all three variables LENDER, DURATION, and PURPOSE are positive and significant (at the 5% level) for the AB_BA relationship, suggesting that the more intense the prior relationship between the acquiring firm and the acquirer's bank advisor, the greater the likelihood that a commercial bank will be chosen as merger advisor. The only other relationship variable that is statistically significant (at the 10% level or better) is the LENDER variable for all possible lending relationships TB_BT, TB_BA, and AB_BT. This suggests that the more intense the lending relationship for both target and acquirer, the more likely they are to choose a commercial bank advisor. Finally, we examine the merger counterparties' lending relationships with banks not chosen as merger advisors and denote them Nonadvisor in Table 8 . We find that most Nonadvisor variables are insignificant, with the exception of Nonadvisor Purpose_A, which denotes the relationship between the acquirer and nonadvisor commercial banks. The more the acquirer has borrowed for general business purposes prior to the merger announcement date from a nonadvisor commercial bank, the smaller the likelihood that a commercial bank advisor with a prior lending relationship will be chosen.
Although the LENDER, DURATION, and PURPOSE variables measure the intensity of prior lending relationships, the existence of past lending does not necessarily guarantee future lending by the bank advisor. To address this issue, we constructed another dummy variable, ACCESS. This variable takes on a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the acquirer's bank is chosen as a financial advisor (by either the target or the acquirer) and the bank lends to the acquirer at any time up to one year (or two years) after the merger announcement date. Table 8 shows that the coefficient on the one-year ACCESS variable is positive and significant at the 5% level, indicating that the access to financing in the future offered by commercial banks with prior lending relationships increases the likelihood that a commercial bank is chosen to advise the merger counterparties. 39 These positive results on the ACCESS variable were robust for different specifications of the logit model. The model's chisquare likelihood ratio test for goodness of fit was 87.8, significant at the 1% level. Thus, we conclude that the relationship between the commercial bank advisor and the acquiring firm primarily impacts the acquirer's access to credit rather than the acquirer's abnormal returns. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the role of commercial banks as advisors to merger participants. If the role of a financial advisor in a merger is to obtain information, then commercial banks potentially have a comparative advantage in advising their banking customers as compared to nonbank advisors (i.e., traditional investment banks). We refer to this as the bank certification effect. All else being equal, we would expect that access to information generated in the course of a lending/credit relationship could be used to certify valuations, thereby increasing the merger counterparties' abnormal returns upon announcement of a merger. However, there is a countervailing influence to the certification effect in that the commercial bank may be faced with a conflict of interest that diminishes the value of any such certification effect. In particular, the bank may be unable to credibly relay information to the market and investors at large if there is concern that the bank's merger advice is clouded by other objectives, such as the repayment of outstanding loans and potential profits from future lending activity. Alternatively, the bank's lending decisions may be distorted by the bank's desire to capture merger advisory fees. Whichever effect predominates determines whether using commercial bank advisors increases or decreases acquirer's and/or target's abnormal returns in mergers and acquisitions.
We empirically examine this issue using a sample of 488 merger deals announced during the time period from January 1, 1995, through December 31, 2000. Of these sampled mergers, 299 utilize one or more commercial bank advisors who 39. When we tested a two-year ACCESS variable (ϭ1 if there was a loan to the acquirer within two years after the merger announcement), we obtained the same results as reported in Table 8. 40. Note that the acquirer is not necessarily constrained to follow value-maximizing policies if agency problems permit management to pursue value-reducing mergers. See discussion in Section 1.3. advise the target, the acquirer, or both. The other 189 sampled merger deals constitute our investment bank control group in which there are no commercial bank advisors, and both the target and the acquirer hire either top-tier or mid-tier investment bank advisors.
We find positive evidence of a net bank certification effect for target firms only. This certification effect takes the form of increased abnormal returns to targets whenever their merger advisor is their own bank (with whom the target has had a prior lending relationship). In contrast, acquirer abnormal returns are either negative or insignificantly different from zero in all cases. Moreover, acquirers appear to utilize prior lending relationships to direct their choice of advisor. The more intense the prior lending relationship between the acquirer and the bank, the more likely it is that that bank will be chosen to advise the acquiring firm in a merger.
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